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then it was too late for him to do anything about it. Now, 
however, the judge   or at least the procedural judge   
knows, and must know, a great deal about the parties' 
evidence and Part 3 2 of the CPR actually gives him power 
to control the evidence. For how long will he be able to 
hold, and for how long will he wish to hold, the 
unattractive line of denying that he has a duty to the truth?
I have suggested that today's generation of lawyers, who 
were brought up under the old system and are bound to 
see the post-Woolf law as to some extent a departure from 
the norm, will continue to find obstacles to harmonisation 
  real or imagined. They may even be right, if they focus 
on topics outside civil procedure as I have defined it for 
this lecture and which it has not been possible for me to 
mention, such as the differences between the Continental 
and the English judiciary and legal professions.
But I believe that in time   when the new Civil 
Procedure Rules have become the system in which all but 
the most ancient of lawyers were brought up   then it will 
be realised that our law is not, in its modes of thought and7 o
in its underlying, unstated, assumptions, any longer so 
different from the Continental.
I believe, therefore, that the proposition of Professor 
Storme and of the authors of the transnational rules, with 
which I earlier expressed disagreement, was premature 
rather than wrong for all time. If that is right, and if it iso o '
right that there is already an important and growing degree 
of unconscious harmonisation   convergence, to use a 
word now fashionable in economics   then the idea that 
deliberate harmonisation has a realistic prospect of success 
will cease to seem far-fetched. Isolationist approaches to 
the reform of civil procedure will cease to be sustainable, 
and what was not, after all, a paradox, will actually become 
one, unless we pay greater attention to the procedural 
systems of other countries and their reform. I hardly need 
say that the same goes for those others as well. @
Professor J A Jolowicz
Trinity College, Cambridge
The labyrinth of major fraud
by George Staple QC
The author, a partner in Clifford Chance and a former Director of the Serious 
Fraud Office, addresses the issue of overlap between different investigations and 
proceedings in major fraud cases and offers some suggestions for harmonisation.
I t must be counted a blessing of the English legal system that when a major financial scandal breaks there is available a range of different processes, each 
one specially designed to respond to a different facet of 
the case.
But anyone who has been involved with one of the 
major fraud cases of recent years (whether as investigator, 
regulator, prosecutor, victim or defendant) cannot help 
but ask whether a system with so much overlap between 
different investigations and proceedings cannot be made 
to work more efficiently.
Our system involves enormous expense and delay, and 
there is now real concern about the impact on such delay 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
In a recent case before the Court of Human Rights in
which directors' disqualification proceedings had been 
stayed until the end of the criminal trial, the court found 
unacceptable delay, which was contrary to the right to a 
fair trial under art. 6 of the convention. So the problem 
has become urgent.
THE RANGE OF PROCEEDINGS
Let us just pause a moment to consider the range and 
nature of all these different processes.
  Criminal proceedings may be brought by the Serious 
Fraud Office, CPS or other prosecuting authorities, e.g. 
HM Customs & Excise or the Inland Revenue. The 
criminal process is, of course, concerned with the 
attribution of blame to a particular individual or group 
of individuals.
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  Civil proceedings may be brought by the Financial 
Services Authority against those subject to its powers. 
They may also be brought by liquidators against those 
who may have defrauded the company, or by the DTI 
for disqualification of company directors. But mainly 
they will be brought by victims as private litigants 
seeking to redress private law wrongs and to remedy loss 
suffered.
  Regulatory proceedings may be brought by regulators 
widiin the FSA regulatory system or by professional 
bodies such as the Office for the Supervision of 
Solicitors or the Accountants' Joint Disciplinary 
Scheme. These are directed to upholding a statutory or 
self-regulatory scheme in the public interest.
  Proceedings before an ombudsman (e.g. pensions or 
financial services ombudsmen) may be brought by 
private parties and are intended to provide a quicker 
and cheaper means of remedying loss than civil 
proceedings.
  The whole matter may also be the subject of an 
investigation by the DTI inspectors under the 
Companies Act or the Financial Services Act. The 
purpose here is to find out how the fraud occurred and 
to consider the merits of criminal proceedings, but also 
to assess its impact in the wider context together with 
possible law reform.
  Lastly, proceedings may be brought by the FSA in 
respect of insider trading, market manipulation or 
money laundering, either as criminal offences or within 
the market abuse regime being set up under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act.
These different sets of proceedings have been refined 
over many years by the legislature and by case law better 
to meet the needs of many different types of case. A 
balance has been struck between all the different interests 
involved, and one therefore approaches reform with the 
utmost caution. However, in a complex case, problems 
undoubtedly arise because it brings into play so many 
different parts of the system at the same time.
In his KPMG lecture in June 1998 the Lord Chancellor 
articulated the problem in an imaginary, but nonetheless 
perfectly credible, case of banking fraud in which no less 
than eight sets of proceedings arose on the same set of 
facts.
I also vividly remember the Sumitomo case, which arose 
shortly before I left the Serious Fraud Office. The case, 
you will remember, involved allegations of cornering the 
copper market. The public prosecutors in Japan 
investigated and proceeded against Mr Hamanaka, the 
man alleged to have been responsible for what had 
happened. Simultaneously in the UK there was a 
Securities and Futures Authority inquiry into the conduct 
of brokers. There was also a London Metal Exchange 
inquiry focusing on the conduct of its members. There
was an inquiry by the Securities and Investments Board as 
the senior regulator, and the SEC in the United States was 
active, as were the US Commodities Regulators. The 
Serious Fraud Office was also investigating with a view to 
possible prosecution of individuals in this country and 
finally, there was massive civil litigation, which rumbles on 
to this day   at least half a dozen class actions and actions 
by Sumitomo. There were almost as many sets of 
proceedings in Maxwell and BCCI, and one can cite many 
other examples.
THE RISKS INVOLVED
More specifically, the risks to which all this legal activity 
taking place at the same time, or at least in quick 
succession, give rise are considerable:
  There is duplication of resources in investigations by the 
police and other investigating authorities.I o o
  There is a risk of inconsistent decisions in different 
proceedings on the same set of facts.
  There are difficulties faced by defendants having to 
defend in a number of different fora at the same time.
  There is a risk of double jeopardy, and in particular 
there is the potential for the proceedings and decisions 
in one process prejudicing the proceedings and 
decisions in another.
  There is the risk posed by multiple use of evidence that 
was gained initially only for a single purpose.
  There are the potentially conflicting roles of an 
individual in various proceedings: for example, being a 
witness in criminal proceedings and also being a 
defendant in disciplinary proceedings. Someone in this 
position may as a result be inhibited from giving 
information to the prosecuting authorities.
  Finally there is the lack of adequate gateways for sharing 
information, which may result in some authorities 
having insufficient information on which effectively to 
proceed.
WHO GOES FIRST?
Multiplicity of proceedings also inevitably raises the 
issue of which should go first: criminal, civil or regulatory. 
There could be tactical advantages for a defendant, for 
example, if the civil proceedings were to go before the 
criminal, as the defendant might be able to obtain more' o
information through the rules of discovery in the civil 
process than would be available to him, at least initially, in 
the criminal process. On the other hand, if the civil or 
regulatory proceedings were to go before the criminal 
trial, then the defendant could risk premature disclosure 
of his defence.
The position is complicated by the scope of the privilege 
against self-incrimination. It is available in criminal cases,o '
but not necessarily in an investigation. The privilege may
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be excluded by the rules of self-regulatory bodies   so that 
where the privilege is abrogated or excluded, the 
defendant may have to reveal information in one set of 
proceedings or investigation that he would not have to 
reveal in another. The issue of priority and of the 
subsequent admissibility of the evidence in different 
proceedings is thus of critical importance to him.
THE INVESTIGATION STAGE
How have we attempted to bring a degree of 
co-ordination to all these different processes? Let us first 
look at the investigation stage. There are no formal rules 
stipulating that any one set of investigations has priority 
over any other, nor are there any requirements on the 
sharing of information obtained. Each authority has a wide 
set of powers to obtain oral and documentary 
information, and legislation allows the transfer of 
information between authorities. When in the Sumitomo 
case all the authorities wanted to get their hands on the 
evidence and interview the witnesses at the same time, it 
was frankly only good informal liaison between them 
which enabled an orderly process to take place.
It is good news, however, that guidelines have been drawn 
up by the Financial Services Authority and the SFO for 
determining when priority should be assigned as between 
those two authorities. This is particularly important now 
that under the new Financial Services and Markets Act the 
Financial Services Authority will have powers of criminal 
prosecution in relation to insider trading, market 
manipulation and money laundering and also the capacity to 
bring regulatory proceedings for market abuse.
But the passage of information between public bodies 
and potential private litigants, including liquidators, is 
somewhat restricted. Generally, banks, legal and 
accountancy professionals and liquidators can be required 
to provide information to public authorities, but 
information cannot move in the other direction. For 
example, it cannot move from public authorities to 
liquidators, at least not without the consent of the person 
giving the information. There are no provisions permitting 
the disclosure of information by public authorities to 
other potential private litigants. The poor old victim, yet 
again, misses out.o '
THE PROCEEDINGS STAGE
When we get beyond the investigation to the stage of 
legal or regulatory proceedings, according to the type of 
proceedings, different rules apply in relation to disclosure 
and standards of proof. So which proceedings are to have 
priority may be all important.
In the common law jurisdictions criminal proceedings 
normally take precedence over civil proceedings. Indeed 
in contrast, for example, to Germany, the courts here do 
not have the power to stay criminal proceedings pending 
the outcome of other proceedings. Civil proceedings, on
the other hand, can be stayed pending the conclusion of 
criminal proceedings (although there is no general rule 
that they should be stayed) in order not to prejudice the 
defendant's position in the criminal trial.
As I have already said, it could be to the advantage of the 
defendant that the civil proceedings come before the 
criminal, as the defendant may be able to obtain more 
information through the rules of discovery than he could 
from the prosecution in a criminal trial. In the US this 
situation is addressed by the prosecuting authorities 
applying for a stay of the civil proceedings (which are 
usually being brought by the SEC) and the SEC will usually 
not object. Indeed, if the stay is not granted the case has 
sometimes been dismissed without prejudice to re-filing 
in order to avoid damaging the criminal case.
OVERLAP
... anyone who has been involved with one of the major 
fraud cases of recent years (whether as investigator, 
regulator, prosecutor, victim or defendant) cannot help 
but ask whether a system with so much overlap between 
different investigations and proceedings cannot be made 
to work more efficiently.
The relationship between regulatory proceedings and 
civil proceedings has been an issue of recent concern. 
Although the courts have the power to stay regulatory 
proceedings, the general principle appears to be that they 
will exercise the power cautiously, and only where there is 
a real risk of serious prejudice which may lead to injustice. 
Factors that the court will take into account in deciding 
whether or not to stay regulatory proceedings include:
  the degree of overlap between them;
  the prejudice that may be caused by disclosure of 
documents in the regulatory proceedings that would not 
be available in civil proceedings;
  whether a decision in the regulatory proceedings would 
prejudice the fair trial of the civil proceedings;
  whether the defendant would be able properly to defend 
two sets of simultaneous proceedings; and
  whether the public interest lies in the urgent resolution 
of regulatory proceedings.
REFORM
The Lord Chancellor's proposal
What then can be done, in particular, to curb some of 
the delay inherent in the system, which now runs the risk 
of falling foul of the European Convention on Human 
Rights? The Lord Chancellor has made a bold and 
imaginative suggestion on the following lines. He 
proposed a single set of proceedings. These would be 
responsible for hearing criminal charges, producing
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reports from investigations and imposing disciplinary 
sanctions on directors and professionals. The proceedings 
would be heard by a High Court judge and two expert
assessors.
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The criminal stage would be heard first, and a jury 
would sit for that stage. The judge and expert assessors 
would be encouraged to take an inquisitorial role and to 
ask detailed questions of witnesses. Once a verdict had 
been reached at that stage, the jury would be dismissed. 
The judge and expert assessors would then consider the 
remaining issues under less stringent rules of evidence. 
More of the story could thus come out.
The judge and assessors would prepare a report akin to 
those that follow a Companies Act or Financial Services 
Act investigation, and it could provide for directors' 
disqualification. The tribunal could also determine 
regulatory sanctions, if the relevant regulatory body had 
agreed to join the proceedings and itself bring charges. 
Civil proceedings would remain outside the unified 
procedure, and would have to wait until the conclusion of 
the procedure before they could begin.
SAFEGUARDS
A system is ... required which would encourage guilty 
defendants to plead guilty, while at the same time 
protecting them from improper pressure to do so. The 
safeguards would have to ensure that any discussions 
would take place in the presence of the defendants and 
their advisers, and the discussions would in all cases be 
recorded ...
To ensure co-ordination of the appropriate bodies 
before the procedure began, the relevant regulatory and 
prosecuting authorities would have to notify each other at 
an early stage that they were investigating the matter and 
likely to take action. They would also be required to pool 
information. Once the SFO, for instance, had decided to 
bring criminal charges, the other authorities would have to 
decide within a reasonably short period of time (four 
months was suggested by the Lord Chancellor) whether 
they were going to join the procedure and bring charges 
diemselves. The judge and expert assessors would be able
to exercise powers of case management which now r o
operate in civil litigation. If the criminal case were 
appealed, the Court of Appeal would be required to rule 
at an early stage and the rest of the unified procedure 
would have to be stayed until the appeal was heard.
The Working Group's response 7~
The Lord Chancellor emphasised that he was not 
announcing any government decisions, promoting any 
new policies, nor taking any personal initiatives. He was 
merely asking questions and seeking views.
In the course of its work on parallel proceedings the 
Society for Advanced Legal Studies' Working Group on 
Financial Regulation gave careful consideration to these 
questions and offered the following views.
Undoubtedly the idea of a single body responsible for 
judging and grading the many degrees of wrongdoing 
following the judge's decision on criminal liability has very 
considerable attraction. The regulatory investigation 
would take place after the criminal trial, so the problem of 
a defendant, as in the case of Ernest Sounders, having to 
answer questions under compulsory powers before a 
criminal trial would not occur. He would only be 
compelled to answer questions after the trial was over, so 
no question of self-incrimination would arise.
Furthermore, witnesses and defendants would be aware 
of the purposes for which their evidence was to be used 
because they would know who the participating bodies 
were. But, above all, the unified procedure would reduce 
the overlap in the investigatory and trial process.
On the other side of the coin all other proceedings 
would have to queue up behind the criminal trial, which 
as we know can be a lengthy process. So far as the 
regulatory proceedings were concerned there was a risk 
that we would be designing delay into the system with all 
the ECHR problems to which that would give rise.
Further delay would be likely to result from interposing 
the fact-finding investigation in the criminal proceedings. 
A Companies Act inspection, for example, is intended to 
be a wide-ranging process to fulfil a number of different 
purposes. The narrow confines of the criminal 
proceedings, which are solely for the purpose of 
establishing guilt and imposing penalties seem ill-suited to 
this wider purpose. As the Working Group commented in 
its report, 'It would be difficult for a narrow trial and an 
investigation of much wider compass to co-exist at the 
trial stage.'
It also has to be recognised that acquittal in the criminal 
trial would sit very uneasily with subsequent regulatory 
proceedings and the imposition of sanctions based on a 
different standard of proof. The whole idea of the 
regulatory process playing second fiddle to the criminal 
process seems to fly in the face of the policy behind the 
Financial Services and Markets Act, which is intended to 
provide, through the new market abuse regime, a quicker 
and more effective route to sanctions for wrong-doing ino o
financial markets.
SOME SOLUTIONS
Should we then despair of finding any way of making 
better sense of the multiplicity of investigations and 
proceedings provided by our system? I think not. With the 
Lord Chancellor's objectives in mind, there are a number 
of ways in which things can be improved.
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The investigation stage
First it must be said that the reform of financial services 
regulation as envisaged by the Financial Services and 
Markets Act should have a considerable impact on parallel 
proceedings within the regulatory field itself. The Act 
brings under the umbrella of a single body nine separate 
regulators operating under the old system. It should 
substantially reduce the need for multiple investigations.
Furthermore as the powers of the Financial Services 
Authority and the SFO move closer together the 
opportunity for joint investigations by those authorities 
will be increased.
Secondly, investigations by DTI inspectors have been 
replaced in many cases by immediate investigations by the 
SFO. The SFO has similar powers of investigation to those 
of DTI inspectors. The difference, however, is that DTI 
inspectors produce a report whereas the SFO does not. 
DTI reports in the main, have been of high quality and 
have shed light on the way in which misconduct has 
occurred and how measures to prevent it in future might 
be introduced both in terms of company law revision and 
in City and boardroom practice.
The SFO in the course of its enquiries assembles a huge 
body of information. There would not seem to be any 
reason why the SFO should not, in appropriate cases, and 
where DTI inspectors have not been appointed, be 
provided with the necessary extra powers and resources in 
order to produce a factual report. It would probably not 
be possible for the report to be published prior to the end 
of the criminal trial. But that usually also applies to a DTI 
inspector's report.
For the SFO, who will be investigating thoroughly for 
the purpose of criminal proceedings, to produce a report 
would avoid considerable duplication of effort. I accept it 
would be a novel role for a prosecuting authority. However 
given that, unlike the CPS, the SFO also has responsibility 
for, and powers of, investigation, in the absence of a DTI 
report, it is not perhaps an unreasonable expectation.
Thirdly it will normally be perfectly satisfactory for 
criminal and regulatory proceedings to proceed in 
tandem, and in SFO cases information can be passed to 
regulators under s. 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987. This 
does not, however, apply to police enquiries, and a clear 
statutory gateway is needed to enable the police to pass 
information to regulators. It would speed things up on the 
regulatory side and avoid further duplication of effort.
Fourthly since the case of Sounders in the European 
Court of Human Rights, there has been much discussion 
about the use of coercive powers to question people. 
However these powers have, in practice, seldom been 
used in relation to those who will be defendants in 
criminal cases. Those powers are, in fact, used almost 
exclusively to interview those who will be witnesses at the 
criminal trial. Where coercive powers are used, albeit
rarely, in relation to potential defendants at the 
investigatory stage, it is now clear that the product cannot 
be put in evidence at the criminal trial. There should, 
therefore, be no difficulty in allowing a regulator to take 
part in such an interview in a criminal case, and indeed 
vice versa. In practice it is likely that both regulators and 
prosecutors will prefer to leave the questioning to one or 
the other, provided that the transcript is available to both.
A similar approach is likely to be appropriate where 
documentary evidence is obtained, either through notices 
or orders to produce, or through other coercive means, 
such as warrants. It is unlikely to be necessary for a 
representative of the other authority to be present, 
provided that the material can be shared as soon as 
possible afterwards.
Therefore with sensible co-operation and minimal 
reform of the law much could be achieved to reduce the 
duplication and increase efficiency at the investigation 
stage between the various prosecuting and regulatory 
authorities involved.
The proceedings stage
Firstly, it is accepted by all that nothing should be done 
to prejudice the fairness of criminal proceedings. But this 
does not mean that other proceedings cannot proceed 
simultaneously, or even before the criminal trial. In the 
Maxwell case this is exactly what happened to some of the 
civil litigation. Although there should be a presumption in 
favour of publication of the result of civil proceedings, if it 
is thought that the jury in trie criminal case might be 
prejudiced by knowledge of it, then, as in the Maxwell case, 
the court can prohibit publication of the evidence and the 
result of the civil case until the criminal proceedings are 
over. There is no reason in principle why regulatory and 
disciplinary proceedings against those who are not 
defendants in the criminal case .should not proceed as 
soon as the regulators are ready. The result, if prejudicial 
to an accused, need not be published until the criminal 
proceedings are over.
Secondly, the position of victims, or office-holders who 
represent them, who want to bring claims to recover their 
loss is not at all satisfactory. As in the case of the SFO, the 
authorities, usually quite quickly, assemble a body of 
material and a fairly clear picture emerges of what has 
happened. But that body of material is not available to civil 
litigants. The Working Group felt strongly that it should be 
made available, provided it would not prejudice criminal 
or regulatory proceedings. A discretion would therefore 
have to be reserved to the authorities, and in most cases 
the material could probably not be passed to civil plaintiffs 
until after the criminal trial.
Thirdly, building on the precedent of disqualification of 
directors, there is scope for an expanded role for the judge 
in the criminal case. There seems no reason why criminal
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judges should not be given some of the powers of 
regulators, including intervention powers. This would 
enable them (i) to close down businesses that are being 
fraudulently run, (ii) to freeze assets before any criminal 
charge is made, and (iii) to order disqualification in 
circumstances akin to those under s. 59 of the Financial 
Services Act 1986. They should also be given greater powers 
to order compensation for the victims of financial crime. 
This would provide the trial judge with the means to 
impose a comprehensive package of imprisonment, fine, 
compensation and disqualification.
PLEA BARGAINING
It is by avoiding the contested trial, with all that that 
implies in terms of expense and consumption of time and 
manpower, that a plea of guilty represents the single most 
effective means of shortening the process. It has to be 
recognised that at present many guilty defendants plead 
not guilty, taking their chance of an acquittal. That may be 
because in weighing up their chances they have no clear 
idea of what the sentence would be if they pleaded guilty. 
But if defendants could be told by the judge what the 
sentence would be on a plea of guilty compared with the 
likely sentence on a finding of guilt after a contested trial, 
so that they could know the saving in cost, anxiety and 
length of sentence, many more might plead guilty where 
the odds were against an acquittal.
A system is therefore required which would encourage 
guilty defendants to plead guilty, while at the same time 
protecting them from improper pressure to do so. The 
safeguards would have to ensure that any discussions 
would take place in the presence of the defendants and 
their advisers, and the discussions would in all cases be 
recorded. There would also be a procedure which would 
take place before the judge for reading to the defendants a 
formal document setting out their rights and reminding 
them that they could not, and should not, plead guilty 
unless they accept their guilt.
Such an arrangement would represent a substantial 
improvement on the present system. The American 
system, however, goes still further. In the United States it 
is possible to incorporate into the plea agreement 
regulatory penalties, which in suitable cases, after a plea of 
guilty in the criminal proceedings, will, together with a 
lesser sentence, satisfactorily meet the demands of justice. 
In an appropriate case on a plea of guilty, the sentence 
could therefore be a lesser prison sentence than might 
otherwise be expected, or even a conditional discharge. 
The conditions could include:
  the payment of substantial fines;
  the full co-operation of the defendant with the 
investigation:o '
  the giving of evidence for the prosecution in a related 
case;
  restitution to the victims of fraud;
  contribution to the costs of the investigation; and
  regulatory penalties such as ceasing to do business in a 
particular market, or the closing-down of a firm.
The regulatory authorities in the United States take part 
in the negotiation of the plea agreement. The attraction of 
achieving quickly and efficiently what might otherwise 
take many months or years does not, in the light of our 
own experience, need to be emphasised.
CONCLUSION
So, although there does not appear to be a single big 
idea that would at a stroke solve the problems that arise 
when proceedings are initiated at different levels within 
the legal and regulatory structure, there are some 
improvements that could be made which would go quite a 
long way to reduce the expense and delay which at present 
are inevitable in a complex case.
Harmonising powers, opening gateways for sharing 
information and the production of reports by the SFO 
would help to reduce the duplication of resources.
The issue of the multiple use of information gained 
initially for a single purpose and the conflicting roles of 
individuals in different processes would be addressed by 
giving individuals notice, at the time of the interview, of 
the persons to whom the information would be given and 
the purposes for which it would be used.
The issue of 'spillover' effects and prejudice of 
proceedings would be addressed not by stay of 
proceedings   which would necessarily hinder the 
effectiveness of the proceedings stayed   but by non- 
publication of the evidence given in, and the result of, 
those proceedings.
Lastly by broadening the range of sanctions that could 
be imposed at the end of the criminal trial, integrating 
regulatory sanctions into the criminal process and the 
development of a formal system of plea bargaining, which 
could incorporate regulatory sanctions, substantial 
inroads could be made into the delay and expense which 
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